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 Interest groups in Western democracies are generally considered to be crucial political actors: 
they socialise their members in democratic practices (Truman, 1951) and – very often – play a 
relevant role in policymaking (Schmitter, 1974). Groups are important mediators between 
constituents and politicians (Dahl, 1961). On the one hand, groups monitor political decision-making 
between elections to make sure the interests of their constituents are dealt with adequately. On the 
other hand, they channel the demands of citizens and of the business community to the political arena 
in addition to more formal conduits, such as elections.  
Perhaps the most widespread tactic that interest groups use to channel constituent demands to 
the political arena is working together in coalitions (Beyers and De Bruycker, 2017; Heaney and 
Lorenz, 2013; Hojnacki, 1997, 1998; Salisbury et al., 1987; Schlozman and Tierney, 1986). By 
recurring to coalition formation, groups are understood to pool (and, in turn, broaden) organisational 
resources (Hula, 1999) and political intelligence (Heaney, 2006), as well as to signal to policymakers 
that a policy position has the support of a large and varied group of interests (Mahoney, 2007, 2008; 
Nelson and Yackee, 2012). This should lead organisations to increase their impact on political 
decision-making. Surprisingly, however, there is hardly any evidence that lobbying coalitions 
actually help groups to exert influence on the policy process. Rather, most studies focusing on the 
effects of lobbying coalitions on policy success find no effect, or even a negative effect, of coalition 
formation on policy influence (Bunea, 2013; Haider-Markel, 2006; Mahoney and Baumgartner, 
2004). 
This leads to a puzzling question: why is it that interest groups seek alliances, if groups that 
work together do not have more impact on decision-making? Our answer is that coalition building is 
a sign of weakness, not of strength. More precisely, we contend that the decision to form an interest 
group coalition is a response to external pressures: groups which perceive themselves as weaker than 
other organisations, both in the political arena and in acquiring financial resources, will increase 
cooperation. In reverse, groups which perceive themselves as stronger than their allies or which have 
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little fear for the survival of the organisation, have fewer incentives to cooperate and therefore will 
be less inclined to actually cooperate with others. In this way, we innovatively conceive coalition 
formation as a fall-back option for less powerful and more vulnerable interest groups to compensate 
for their weak starting position; hence it is not surprising that their impact on policymaking remains 
slim. We thus conceptualise interest group coalition formation as a defensive rather than an offensive 
strategic option.  
Next to our theoretical innovation, our analyses are also based on a new and extensive dataset 
covering a broad range of interest group strategies, and coalition formation in particular. We analyse 
a sample of around 3000 interest groups in six European countries (Belgium, Italy, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden) and the European Union (EU) (Beyers et al., 2016), which is 
easily the most comprehensive dataset on lobbying coalitions to date. This allows for a rigorous test 
of why interest groups form coalitions. More broadly, we contribute to the scholarship on EU and 
comparative politics as the data highlight how coalitions vary across countries and governance levels: 
in corporatist countries, coalition building is more common than in pluralist countries, whereas the 
multi-layered nature of political systems has little impact on these dynamics. 
 
Coalition formation and influence  
Politics is always about competition and compromises: all political actors and organisations – 
political parties and their leaders, interest groups, social movements, and also countries and 
international organisations in international relations – either compete by advocating different political 
views or reach compromises between more or less common policy preferences. In doing so, political 
actors often recur to coalitions: indeed, it is quite uncommon that the two sides of any potential 
political issue are advocated by one lone political actor.  
The literature concerning why interest groups form alliances is relatively under-developed, but 
a substantial literature has emerged during the past decades (Heaney, 2006; Heaney and Lorenz, 2013; 
Hojnacki, 1997, 1998; Holyoke, 2009; Mahoney, 2007, 2008). Most of these studies set out to analyse 
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how cooperation is used as a political strategy in order to increase the impact groups might have in 
the political arena. Nelson and Yackee (2012: 339), for example, argue that ‘[…] interest groups rank 
coalition participation among their top influence tactics’; similarly, Heaney (2004: 258) states that 
‘[…] lobbying in coalitions […] is perceived to help determine the shape of public policy’ and ‘[…] 
working together in coalition is one of the most common tactics that groups use in attempting to 
influence policy’ (Heany and Lorenz 2013: 252). 
It is therefore no surprise that studies on coalition formation try to find out whether, and how, 
coalition formation is related to influence. This comes in two flavours. First, as influence is 
notoriously hard to measure, some have analysed whether traditionally ‘stronger’ interest 
organisations engage more in coalition lobbying as a proxy for influence. The results, however, 
surprisingly suggest that traditionally ‘weaker organisations’ coalesce more than groups which we 
tend to perceive as ‘stronger’. For instance, several studies have analysed whether business groups – 
as the more powerful political actors – or nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) are more likely to 
form coalitions. The majority of these studies find that NGOs coalesce more often (Beyers and De 
Bruycker, 2017: 6; Clark and Wilson, 1961: 162; Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991; Klüver, 2013; Salisbury, 
1990), while only one study finds that business groups form coalitions more often (Hojnacki, 1997: 
70). In line with this, coalitions are more often found to be used by resource-poor organisations 
(Beyers and De Bruycker, 2017; Holyoke, 2009; Junk, 2017) than by more resource-rich groups 
(Sorurbakhsh, 2016). In short, while these studies do not use a direct measure for influence, there is 
a strong suggestion in this literature that coalition formation is not used by the most powerful actors.  
Group characteristics are not always very accurate proxies for influence. For this reason, other 
studies have linked coalition strategies to actual policy influence. The results are, nonetheless, quite 
consistent with those presented above. That is, few studies see some positive effects of coalition 
formation, yet most see no effect, or a negative effect, of coalition formation on policy success (Junk 
2017). On the ‘positive side’, Nelson and Yackee (2012) show that coalition participants have more 
success when there is consensus across the messages sent from the coalition and where coalitions are 
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larger. However, Heinz and colleagues (Heinz et al., 1993: 346) find no relationship between the size 
of interest coalitions and the success of influencing policy proposals in the United States, and similar 
(null) results have been presented by Bunea (2013), Haider-Markel (2006), Junk (2017) and Mahoney 
and Baumgartner (2004). 
All this leads to a puzzling question: why do so many interest groups still work together, if 
doing so does not seem to increase their political influence (Gray and Lowery, 1998: 11)? We suspect 
that cooperation to influence public policy is not initiated out of strength, but out of weakness. 
Moreover, we argue that a crucial motivation for coalition building is not only policy influence, but 
also interest group survival: organisations which perceive themselves as weaker – both politically 
and financially – have a greater incentive to work together to face those external threats, while 
organisations which (think they) are politically more dominant and financially more stable, have 
fewer incentives to cooperate. The paradoxical effect is that coalitions do not produce positive 
political results, because they consist mostly of the less dominant actors, not those which are powerful 
and central in interest group communities.  
 
The argument: Coalition formation as a fall-back option 
Our starting assumption is straightforward: interest groups prefer to lobby alone and only look 
at potential coalitional partners as a fall-back option for their political activity. One only has to look 
at different political organisations – for example, political parties in domestic (or European) politics, 
or states in international relations – to understand the plausibility of this assumption. Most parties 
would form a single-party government, if they had the majority of seats in parliament. Single-party 
governments are in fact more likely to control the parliament (Döring, 1995), to last in office (Laver, 
2003) and to legislate effectively (Louwerse, 2012; Pritoni, 2017) than coalition governments. Very 
similar arguments have been proposed in the study of international relations by scholars following 
the so-called ‘neo-realist approach’ (Waltz, 1979). Neo-realists, in fact, argue that secondary states 
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tend to coalesce among themselves in order to counterbalance the supremacy of a hegemonic power 
(Grieco, 1996; Waltz, 1979: 126-127), who, on the contrary, has no incentive to look for allies. 
While there have certainly been exceptions to these general ideas, our argument follows the 
same basic logic: (self-perceived) weakness, not strength, is the driving force behind coalition 
formation1. Moreover, we argue that weakness is framed not only in terms of political power (Junk, 
2017), but also in terms of the survival prospects of an interest group (Beyers and De Bruycker, 2017: 
3). In other words, coalition formation is not only driven by a (perceived) weak political position, but 
also by a (perceived) weak financial position.  
First, we analyse how the fear of not being politically influential affects the decision to form an 
interest group coalition. We assume here that the groups which fear that they will have more limited 
impact on decision-making procedures will mainly resort to coalition lobbying, while groups which 
expect to have an impact will more often opt to lobby alone. As for any other political actors, our 
reasoning is based on the cost-benefit analysis groups make. Organisations that perceive themselves 
as being particularly strong in policymaking are less likely to look for partners, because each new 
addition to the network implies more costs (above all, with regard to the necessity to reach 
compromises with different groups) than benefits. Strong groups will assume that they are likely to 
see some of their demands reflected in policymaking, and that their chances will not increase when 
they decide to form an alliance. However, the costs of working together are substantial, as they have 
to coordinate a network, must compromise on their demands, and cannot individually claim the credit 
for success to their members (Browne, 1990; Hojnacki, 1998: 62). Hence, the costs associated with 
coalition building are perceived to be higher than the potential gains. Other things being equal, these 
groups are thus likely to prefer to work alone. 
This is entirely different for groups which perceive themselves as less politically influential 
than other organisations. For these groups, the potential gains of working together with another 
organisation are more substantial. That is, if nothing changes, they are likely to lose out. Yet, if groups 
work together this might strengthen their position (Junk, 2017). As a consequence, coalition lobbying 
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can be seen as a ‘weapon of the weak’. The potential gains, we expect, make groups willing to pay 
the price of coalition building. However, as the strongest organisations are less inclined to cooperate, 
coalitions will likely emerge that contain mostly weaker actors. This would explain why overall 
coalition lobbying tends not to produce many positive political outcomes.  
H1: Organisations that perceive themselves as less politically influential than their potential 
allies are more likely to form coalitions. 
 
Second, interest groups are not only interested in policy influence, but also in organisational 
survival (Beyers and De Bruycker, 2017; Gray and Lowery, 1998; Hojnacki, 1998). We analyse how 
the fear of not being financially secure, which we label here as financial vulnerability, represents a 
high incentive for interest groups to cooperate. Previous research has shown that interest groups that 
face strong competition for funding indeed make different strategic decisions compared to groups 
that face limited competition for funding. For instance, groups confronted with many competitors for 
funding, other things being equal, substantially increase outside lobbying efforts, to increase visibility 
(Hanegraaff et al., 2016), select to lobby on issues which garner much public exposure (Bob, 2005), 
or become less critical towards government (Salgado, 2014). In these cases, group strategic decisions 
are not driven (solely) by influence seeking imperatives, but by the need to secure long-term funding.  
Interestingly, applied to coalition formation, former studies have argued that increased 
competition for resources, should lead to less coalition formation because groups want to secure their 
own identity in a competitive environment (Beyers and De Bruycker, 2017; Hojancki, 1998). We, 
instead, expect that, if organisations fear that their funding sources are at risk, they have a stronger 
incentive to cooperate. First of all, the studies that claimed that competition should lead to less 
cooperation are not empirically confirmed. Both Hojnacki (1998) and Beyers and De Bruycker (2017) 
find that groups which face more competition actually coalesce more often and are subsequently 
puzzled by these findings. The findings do, however, fit our reasoning. That is, we fully agree that 
groups aim to create a unique identity towards members and are therefore not inclined to form 
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coalitions. Yet, and this is our contribution, not all groups are successful in doing this. We contend 
that groups that are successful in claiming a unique identity face fewer risks to their survival. In 
contrast, those that have not been successful in claiming a unique position are at risk of ceasing to 
exist. The solution for these organisations is to search for alternative resource pools and attract new 
types of donors. One way of gaining the attention of a new membership base is through coalition 
building. In this way, they show to potential new members that they are active on different issues and 
‘open’ for new membership. However, as in the case of influence, financially stronger groups are less 
likely to agree to such requests for cooperation, as they are expected to be protective of their 
membership base. In short, groups that believe that crucial resources for their long-term survival – 
namely funding – are not likely to decrease in the near future should be more inclined to defend their 
‘stable claim to resources’, while groups that perceive themselves as more threatened by this kind of 
challenge seek to expand their resource base through cooperation.  
To substantiate this claim, and to be sure of our causal reasoning, we rely on a more direct 
measure of survival prospects than competition for resources, used by previous studies. That is, we 
rely on an indicator measuring directly the survival prospects of interest groups due to the more 
limited opportunities for funding. In this way we can analyse, for the first time, how actual survival 
prospects of interest groups affect their decision to form alliances.  
H2: Organisations that perceive their existence to be threatened by decreasing funding 
opportunities are more likely to form coalitions. 
 
Research design 
For this article, we make use of data gathered in the Comparative Interest Group Survey (CIGS) 
(Beyers et al. 2016). This survey addresses the organisational characteristics, political activities and 
strategies of interest groups. At the moment, it has been set out and completed in Belgium, Italy, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Sweden, while it is planned to be conducted in the UK, 
Germany, Spain, the Czech Republic and Poland2 in the near future. Therefore, the countries we take 
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into account in this study – together with the EU – represent all the polities for which data are 
currently available. 
As for our unit of analysis – individual interest groups – a key distinction can be made in the 
literature between the ‘behavioural definition’ (Baumgartner et al., 2009) and the ‘organisational 
definition’ (Jordan and Greenan, 2012) of interest groups. In the first case, groups are defined based 
on their observable, policy-related activities; in the second case, the ‘interest group’ term is reserved 
only for membership associations. As for the CIGS, the latter definition is preferred, and only non-
profit organisations have been included in the survey. Overall, the response rate of the survey was 38 
percent, which is relatively high, compared with other online surveys (Marchetti, 2015). Moreover, 
the response rate is quite evenly distributed across countries. More precisely, response rates were as 
follows, from lowest to highest: Italy (32%); Slovenia (36%); the EU (36%); the Netherlands (38%); 
Lithuania (40%); Belgium (41%); Sweden (42%). 
The statistical models are operationalised as follows (see also Table 1). Our dependent variable 
is based on a question: ‘During the last 12 months, how often has your organisation been involved in 
establishing coalitions with like-minded organisations?’. Respondents could choose from five 
options, ranging between ‘not at all’ (value 1), ‘once a year’ (value 2), ‘once every three months’ 
(value 3), ‘once a month’ (value 4), and ‘once a week’ (value 5). Given the ordinal nature of this data, 
we rely on ordered logistic regressions in the analyses and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions 
as robustness checks (see the Online appendix).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
For our independent variables, we rely on two key indicators. For our first hypothesis, i.e. the 
fear of not being policy influential, we rely on the following question: ‘How would you rate your 
organisation’s influence on public policy compared to that of your (potential) allies?’. Respondents 
could indicate whether they thought they were more influential (= 1); had roughly the same influence 
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(= 2); or saw themselves as less influential than their (potential) allies (= 3). We use ‘more influential’ 
as the reference category. For hypothesis 2, we rely on a question directly tapping into the fear 
organisations have of ceasing to exist due to lack of funding opportunities. We asked: ‘How severe 
are decreasing funding opportunities challenging the survival of your organisation?’. Respondents 
could indicate: ‘not at all’ (= 1) to ‘very much’ (= 5). This variable allows us to directly link the 
financial vulnerability of groups to their coalition strategies. As a robustness check, we also include 
competition for resources (see the Online appendix).  
Furthermore, we will retest some earlier hypotheses and include them as control variables. 
First, we include ‘group type’ and we make a distinction between business groups, which we chose 
as the reference category, citizen groups and other groups. The second control variable is ‘budget’. 
On this, we asked about the annual operating budget of the organisation in 2016 in Euros; we log-
transformed the values given the skewed distribution of this variable. For the third control variable, 
‘professionalisation’, we rely on several related indicators: decision-making, hiring policy, staff 
training and employees’ career prospects. Our variable is an average score based on each of these 
indicators. The next control variable is ‘representation’ (Gray and Lowery, 1998). This variable 
captures the lobbying intent of an organisation, which can be either a group that particularly aims to 
represent its members to politicians or a group that does not see lobbying as one of its core tasks 
(despite occasionally doing so). Here, we rely on a question in which we ask whether or not the 
organisation was ‘very involved in representing members towards political actors’ as one of their key 




Given the extensive nature of our data, descriptive statistics can already reveal a lot regarding 
our main message. We present three types of descriptive data. First, to gain some general knowledge 
on the data, we provide insights on the differences across countries. Second, directly focused on our 
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research question, we analyse whether coalition building can be meaningfully linked to a logic of 
influence and survival, one of the main premises of our theoretical framework. Third, we analyse 
some bivariate analyses to test the plausibility of our main hypotheses. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE] 
 
To start, Table 2 summarises coalition formation across our six countries and in the EU. When 
observing this table, one main aspect jumps out: country-specific differences matter. Indeed, 
Cramér’s V is equal to 0.213. Sweden is the country where interest groups recur to coalition formation 
the most, showing the highest results for both the ‘once a week’ and ‘once a month’ categories; on 
the contrary, interest organisations in Slovenia and in Lithuania are less likely to build coalitions with 
like-minded groups. Mahoney (2007) suggested that the difference in democratic accountability of 
policymakers would be the key causal mechanism underlying differences across countries. We do not 
really see this in our analysis. This would mean, for instance, that coalition building would be least 
common in the EU, yet it ranks second in terms of propensity for coalition-building (with only 
Sweden ahead of it). Another explanation is that the multi-layered nature of political systems would 
enhance cooperation. This seems like a more viable option. Both the EU and Belgium have distinct 
levels of governance, and they both rank quite high in terms of coalition formation. However, more 
research should be carried out to shed light on this issue, because Sweden and the Netherlands score 
equally high or even higher, which is not in line with this hypothesis.  
We therefore see as the most likely explanation for variation across countries, the corporatist 
structure of the political system. With corporatist countries like Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium 
(Jahn, 2014), as well as the EU, which is seen as a case of elite pluralism (Eising, 2007), scoring 
higher than Lithuania, Slovenia and Italy, which are all less corporatist countries. This could be 
explained by the fact that in corporatist systems, interest groups are forced by the government to 
coalesce as the latter tends to provide access only to a selective set of interest organisations. As a 
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consequence, groups which lack access seek alliances with groups that do have access. This 
mechanism would align neatly with the basic premise of this article, namely that interest groups form 
coalitions out of weakness and not out of strength. 
Going further, our examination rests on the assumption that interest groups use coalition 
formation not only as a defensive strategic option to increase their policy influence, but also to 
overcome challenges linked with declining resources, in a logic of organisational survival. To see 
whether this is indeed a plausible assumption, we present an overview of the different goals groups 
indicate they have when seeking coalitions. Table 3 samples groups on the basis of whether they ever 
collaborate with other organisations in conducting relevant activities (i.e. funding research, 
fundraising, sharing staff, coordinating lobbying, etc.). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE] 
 
Overall, the variance among different activities is rather high: on the one hand, interest 
organisations appear to collaborate frequently among themselves in representing stakeholders in 
committees (64.4%), in producing joint statements and/or position papers (71.2%), and in 
coordinating political strategies (52.8%); on the other hand, they are less likely to join forces in 
swapping supporter lists (20.2%), sharing staff and personnel (23.0%), fundraising (21.7%) and 
funding research (27.3%). It appears that the main incentive for coalition building is signalling that a 
position on a particular issue is supported by a broad consensus (Mahoney, 2007, 2008; Nelson and 
Yackee, 2012), whereas pooling resources and political intelligence is less appealing (Heaney, 2006; 
Hula, 1999). 
However, these data also show that interest groups do not form coalitions exclusively with the 
aim of being influential in the policymaking. Swapping supporter lists, sharing staff and personnel, 
jointly fundraising and funding research are not primarily oriented towards policy influence, while 
this kind of action is very much relevant for organisation survival. This confirms that our decision to 
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focus also on the question of survival as a reason for interest group coalition formation is a reasonable 
one. 
Finally, we provide some bivariate statistics to highlight the plausibility of our argument. First, 
what is the relationship between influence vulnerability and the propensity to form alliances? The 
bivariate correlation indeed indicates a significant positive relation (p = 0.00) between being 
‘influence vulnerable’ and the frequency of cooperation (r = 0.11). Of the respondents who indicate 
that they see themselves as stronger than their allies, 15% indicate that they form coalitions more 
than once every three months; for groups which see themselves as weaker than their allies, 30% 
indicate that they form coalitions more than once every three months. This is a substantial difference, 
and in line with our expectation. 
For ‘financial vulnerability’, we again find a significant relationship (p = 0.00) in the direction 
we expected. That is, groups that experience more financial vulnerability are more likely to form 
coalitions (r = 0.12): 38% of groups indicating that they are very much afraid of becoming extinct 
due to a lack of funding opportunities, indicate that they form coalitions at least once every three 
months. For groups which are less worried about their survival, only 24% indicate that they form 
coalitions at least once every three months. Hence, this confirms our assertion that not the strongest 
organisations work together more frequently, but rather the weakest organisations that seek alliances 
more often. The question is now: how does this hold in a multivariate analysis?  
 
Multivariate analyses  
We now turn to the multivariate analysis (see Table 4). Our dependent variable is the inclination 
of groups to form coalitions with allies. As this is an ordinal variable, we rely on an ordered logit 
regression with robust standard errors to correct for the potential presence of heteroskedasticity in the 
regression’s error term. To make sure our findings are robust, we provide several alternative models 
in the Online appendix: first, we provide an alternative test of the dependent variable (an OLS 
regression as the dependent variable contains five values which are normally distributed). Second, 
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we also include a robustness check that accounts for the various levels in which the data is collected. 
Third, while in the original model we rely on fixed effects (country dummies), we also provide a 
multilevel model. Finally, we test the potential impact of the level of corporatism on our findings and 
add a robustness check for one of our key independent variables, financial vulnerability. All analyses 
produce the same results highlighting the robustness of the findings. In Table 4, we provide four 
models: in Model 1, we test the model without the new variables presented in this paper. In other 
words, we retest the ‘state-of-the-art’ with respect to our new database. In Model 2, we add the 
influence vulnerability indicator; in Model 3 we add the financial vulnerability indicator. In Model 4, 
we summarise the full model. We present the results by discussing first the hypotheses and then some 
of the outcomes concerning the control variables. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE] 
 
The influence vulnerability hypothesis stated that groups who consider themselves to be less 
influential than their allies are more inclined to cooperate, whereas the opposite holds true for groups 
perceiving themselves to be more influential than their potential allies. The results are portrayed in 
Models 2 and 4 of Table 4. Both analyses show that the difference in allying is significantly correlated 
with the potential influence groups ascribe to their own organisation. This means that, whether or not 
groups frequently form coalitions, once they perceive themselves as weaker than their potential allies, 
their propensity to ally increases. To visualise the substantial effects of this mechanism, we plotted 
the predicted probabilities for this relationship (see Figure 1)4. Here, one can see that groups which 
see themselves as stronger than their allies are predicted to rely 15% less on coalition formation than 
groups which see themselves as weaker than their allies (predicted score of 2.3 and 2.6). Overall, this 
thus confirms H1: groups which (think they) are weaker in influencing policymakers are more 
inclined to cooperate.    
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More broadly, it confirms our assumption that weaker groups – precisely like weaker parties in 
domestic and European politics and weaker states in international relations – need to form coalitions 
to face a common threat: they are more united in fear than united in interests. Their decision to recur 
to coalition formation represents a defensive strategic option they employ to counterbalance the risk 
that another group is predominant in policymaking (see also Junk, 2017). The very fact that groups 
which are politically weaker than their peers flock together more frequently is, we believe, the main 
reason that coalition formation is a poor predictor of policy success (Bunea, 2013; Haider-Markel, 
2006). 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE] 
 
Second, we consider the effect of financial vulnerability on the propensity to form coalitions. 
We hypothesised that groups whose survival is at risk due to decreasing funding opportunities are 
more likely to form coalitions. The results are presented in Models 3 and 4, Table 4, and the outcomes 
confirm this expectation: the more groups fear that their financial resources are going to decline in 
the close future, the more they are inclined to form alliances. To visualise the substantial effects of 
this mechanism, we again plotted the predicted probabilities for this relationship (see Figure 2). The 
results show a clear positive relationship between financial vulnerability and the inclination to form 
coalitions. If a group fears it may cease to exist, it tends to increase its coalition activities. Groups 
with no fear have a predicted coalescing score of 2.05; this increases to nearly 2.33 for groups with 
much, or very much, fear. This corresponds with a predicted increase of more than 10% in coalition 
building.  
Previous studies have relied on a different measure of survival prospects, namely competition 
for resources (Beyers and De Bruycker, 2017). While this is a somewhat crude indicator to measure 
organisations’ fear for their survival, it is a commonly used proxy. To make sure our findings speak 
to these studies, we also used competition for resources as an indicator5. The results are exactly in 
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line with our more direct measure of survival prospects (see the Online appendix): greater competition 
for resources, just as greater fear for survival, leads to more coalition formation. Overall, we can thus 
clearly confirm H2: groups which see themselves as weaker than their allies in terms of their long-
term survival prospects are more inclined to cooperate. 
Looking back to the previous literature, this latter finding is particularly interesting. While 
previous research highlighted the fact that groups facing more competition should be less inclined to 
work together to maintain a unique position (Gray and Lowery, 1998; Hojnacki, 1997; Holyoke, 
2009), we provide a different view. That is, it is plausible that groups which face high competition 
are more concerned about maintaining a unique identity towards their members and are, therefore, 
less likely to join coalitions. However, if survival is threatened, they might come to the conclusion 
that this doesn’t work. For some groups – namely, the weakest in the policy community – isolation 
has apparently not worked, as their own survival is now threatened. In cost-benefit terms: when the 
benefit of maintaining ‘uniqueness’ is lower than the potential cost of ‘passing away’ as an 
organisation, working together in coalition is better than isolation. More precisely, weaker groups 
have an incentive to widen up and search for alternative funding, and coalition building, our results 
suggest, provides them with this opportunity. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE] 
 
This brings us to the control variables, which are important to indicate whether our arguments 
speak to the previous literature and, therefore, whether results change once we include controls for 
perceived fears of interest groups. A first interesting finding relates to group type. Most former studies 
found that NGOs are more likely to form coalitions than other kinds of groups (Beyers and De 
Bruycker, 2017: 6; Mahoney, 2007; but see Hojnacki, 1997: 70) and ascribe this to their appeal to 
public opinion. Our results challenge this causal mechanism. That is, if we do not control for financial 
and influence vulnerability, we actually do find that NGOs more often seek coalitions with others. 
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Importantly, however, if we include influence and financial vulnerability in the analyses, this effect 
disappears. In other words, the effect of group type seems to be driven by the fact that NGOs are 
more often faced with financial and influence vulnerability, hence not (mostly) because of the type 
of issues they tend to represent. This finding emphasises the importance of including influence and 
financial vulnerability in the analysis. Not only does it have a substantial direct effect, but it also 
affects the interpretation of other variables and, notably, sheds new light on regularities which have 
been stressed at length in the literature so far. 
Another notable observation pertains to financial resources. Budget has a positive effect on 
groups’ propensity to form coalitions: richer groups are more likely to form coalitions than poorer 
organisations. At first sight, this may seem to contradict what we hypothesised (and empirically 
confirmed) before: namely, that the more a group perceives itself as weaker than their potential allies, 
the more it recurs to coalition formation. Yet, the inclusion of influence and financial vulnerability 
does have a strong mitigating effect on economic and financial resources. That is, the strength of 
resources bisects once the controls for relative strength are included. Moreover, resources of 
individual organisations have shown to be a poor predictor of influence (Baumgartner and Mahoney, 
2015; Dür, et al. 2015; Klüver, 2013). The reason is that richer groups tend to compete politically and 
financially with richer groups (and vice versa for poorer groups: see Baumgartner and Mahoney, 
2015; Lowery, 2013). Hence, it is not substantial measures of resources that affect influence and 
survival prospects, but rather a groups’ relative (and, above all, perceived) strength compared to 
groups with which they compete. Our results are in line with these findings. This means that groups 
that have more resources might coalesce more frequently, but not because they see themselves – 
correctly – as politically stronger or more financially stable than their peers (Junk, 2017). 
Furthermore, among the control variables, in Model 4, also the relationship between 
professionalization and representation, on the one hand, and the likelihood to form coalitions, on the 
other, is statistically significant. This means that interest groups that are more involved in professional 
lobbying activities are also more likely to look for allies to advocate their policy positions than groups 
18 
 
that are mainly focused on organising events, coordinating tasks for the community, and so on, which 
is perfectly plausible: the latter do not need any help for following their aims. 
Finally, as already claimed in the section on descriptive statistics, there are substantial country 
differences and in the direction we anticipated: in corporatist countries, coalition building is more 
common than in pluralist countries. This is even more clearly portrayed in the Online appendix, in 
which we included Jahn’s (2014) corporatist scale as a control variable in the analysis (instead of 
country dummies) and find a substantial and significant relationship. The fact that interest groups in 
corporatist settings more frequently cooperate nicely aligns with our main findings: i.e. that interest 
groups form alliances out of a position of weakness and not strength. While it is certainly encouraging 
that the results are in line with our reasoning, it is important to note that we should be careful drawing 
too strong conclusions about systematic mechanisms in countries as we rely on data collected at the 
individual level. Therefore, more research is needed which explicitly takes into account a broader 
view on corporatism and its potential effects. More broadly, the differences we observe across 
countries highlight the value of comparative research designs in the field of interest group politics. 
We therefore urge future scholars to further flesh out the effect of various interest mediation systems 
on interest group strategies and their outcomes.    
 
Conclusion 
Napoleon once famously said: ‘there are only two forces that unite men – fear and interest’ 
(quoted in Law and Lincoln Rhodes, 1916). Most scholars working on interest group coalitions have 
focused on the latter motivation, the political interests that unite them. In this paper, instead, we have 
focused on the other motive for forging alliances: fear. Fear, either of a lack of influence or a lack of 
funding, is a substantial driver for groups to form alliances. Our main findings confirm this suspicion. 
First, groups assess their own power compared with (potential) allies and seek cooperation more often 
if they think they are less powerful. Second, groups which face more threats to their survival due to 
a lack of funding opportunities form coalitions more often than groups that do not face these obstacles. 
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Therefore, we should treat coalition formation not as a sign of strength, but primarily as a sign of 
weakness: other things being equal, groups prefer to work alone, whereas coalition formation 
represents a defensive strategic option employed by groups perceiving that they are not able to lobby 
on their own.  
Moreover, when evaluating findings of former studies, if we include in statistical models our 
new independent variables, we find clear and important differences compared to previous results. 
This is a further indication of the plausibility of our reasoning. That is, we did not find any difference 
between group types, yet only if we control for influence and financial vulnerability. This emphasises 
the importance of these variables when seeking to explain interest group coalition building. More 
broadly, it indicates that NGOs do not seek coalitions more often than business groups because of 
their claim to public opinion; rather, it relates to their weaker overall position in politics, in terms of 
both influence and funding. 
We believe these results have broader relevance as they reflect on which interest groups lobby, 
and why. Often, we reflect on the power of interest groups by analysing how influential (or not) they 
have been in the political arena. But perhaps, as Lowery (2013: 18) suggests, we should interpret 
lobbying activities more as a sign of ‘the very weaknesses of the organised interests. […] Had 
organised interests been truly influential, there should have been no policy disturbance to begin with’. 
We interpret coalition formation along similar lines: the more powerful a group perceives itself to be, 
the fewer incentives it has to actively engage in forming alliance with others. Hence, more lobbying 
activity, in this case through coalition formation, logically leads to less influence. We believe the 
literature can benefit from taking such an approach when explaining why interest groups lobby in the 
way they do (Lowery, 2007). 
Still, some caution is warranted. First, our assumption rests on the ‘other things being equal’ 
prefix. Yet, as we know, in many cases, not all things are equal. For instance, different policymakers 
have different preferences. This means that interest groups might behave differently when they target 
politicians from when they target bureaucrats. It might be that the former are more inclined to push 
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groups to work together (Mahoney, 2007, 2008). In these circumstances, working together might be 
a sensible option for strong organisations (too). One could think of many more exceptions to our 
findings. Yet, what we hope to have achieved is showing that lobbying in coalitions is the anomaly 
that needs explanation, not the lack of coalition formation. This is an important difference, and much 
closer aligned to findings on a lack of correspondence between coalition formation and policy 
success.     
Another point is the generalisability of our findings. While we have presented data based on 
the largest comparative survey on interest group strategies to date, most of the countries are more 
corporatist than pluralist. This could affect the results as access is skewed towards more powerful 
actors in corporatist countries. Hence, this could mean that in such systems weaker organisations 
must cooperate. This might function somewhat differently in pluralist countries, where access is quite 
easier to gain, even for weaker organisations. We therefore welcome studies focusing on more 
pluralist countries.  
Our findings also warrant more in-depth analyses, which would aim to understand the specific 
variations we observed among countries. For instance, why do we see so much more coalition 
lobbying in Sweden than in other corporatist welfare states such as the Netherlands and Belgium? 
What explains the similar levels of cooperation between interest groups in Italy, Slovenia, and 
Lithuania? And more broadly, what country factors affect the propensity of interest groups to work 
together? All these questions fall beyond the scope of this paper but are important questions we should 
explore further.  
To summarise, in a recent article, Mahoney and Baumgartner (2014: 214) argued that ‘lobbyists 
are like wolves’, and ‘lobby in packs’. In our view, this is only partially true. We contend that wolves 
hunt in packs because they are rather weak individually. Stronger animals, such as lions, hunt alone. 
They do not need partners to catch their prey, and therefore do not have to share the prize. We see 
weaker interest organisations as wolves: they cannot survive on their own and therefore seek allies. 
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Strong organisations prefer to lobby alone, allowing them to keep all the gains to themselves. This, 







1 The argument that weak interest groups team together is not completely new: it can already be found in the class 
theory of Claus Offe for the business versus worker interest groups (Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980). 
2 The basic questionnaire has been translated by each of the research teams and adapted to the national context. To 
ensure comparability, the substantive meaning of the questions and categories was left unchanged as much as possible. 
In each country, organisations have been selected by national research teams, fitting to the national setting. The two 
authors of this paper are principal investigators of two country teams, so they collected this data on their own for two 
countries. The project allows each member to use the data of other countries as well: this makes it possible to work with 
such a large dataset. 
3 Cramér’s V is a measure of association between two nominal variables: it varies from 0 (corresponding to no 
association between the variables) to 1 (complete association) and may be viewed as the association between two variables 
as a percentage of their maximum possible variation (Cramér, 1946). 
4 The predicted probabilities plots are based on a linear prediction of coalition formation as presented in the Online 
appendix. The results of this analysis are extremely similar to the ordered logistic regression. As OLS regression 
coefficients are easier to interpret we opted to present these in the main text. Moreover, we plot the predicted values based 
on the most complete model, which is Model 4.  
5 Here, we rely on the following question: ‘In general, how much competition does your organisation face from other 
organisations in its attempts to recruit members, increase donations, or obtain EU or national government funding etc.?’. 
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Tables and figures 
 
Table 1 – Summary statistics for analyses in paper 




1 = no; 2 = once/year; 3 = once/three 
months; 4 = once/month; 5 = 
once/week. 
  2.40 1 
 
5 
Independent variable I 
H1: Influence 
vulnerability 
1 = more influential than allies 
2 = evenly influential as allies 
3 = less influential than allies. 
2.04 1 3 
Independent variable II 
H2: Financial 
vulnerability  
1 = low; 2 = somewhat; 3 = moderate; 




Control variables     
Group type 1 = business (n = 1306); 2 = citizen 
group (n = 2044); 3=rest (n = 2199) 
N.A.   
Resources Budget of organisation log-
transformed.  
11.84 8.52 16.12 
Professionalisation Recruiting staff; career opportunities; 
type of specialised departments in 
organisation.  
1.12 0 3.67 
Representation An organisation specifically indicates 
to represent members as core function 
of organisation.  
0.77 0 1 
Country Belgium (n  963), Italy (n = 479), 
Lithuania (n = 365); Netherlands (n = 
875); Slovenia (n = 439); Sweden (n 




Corporatism scale Country classification according to 
level of corporatism (see Jahn, 2014).  













                                                                                                                                                                                                
Table 2 – During the last 12 months, how often has your organisation been involved in 
establishing coalitions with like-minded organisations? 
Frequency Bel EU Ita Lit Neth Slo Swe 
At least once a week 3.6 4.8 3.1 0.0 5.0 0.5 12.1 
At least once a month 17.0 17.2 11.6 5.3 12.3 4.0 23.3 
At least every three months 21.7 25.8 21.7 9.7 28.0 13.2 26.6 
At least once 30.9 37.7 46.5 33.0 33.8 30.9 29.7 
We did not do this 26.8 14.4 17.1 51.5 20.9 52.1 8.3 
No. of observations 641 644 387 361 397 379 636 
Notes: X² = 617.98; V (Cramér) = 0.21; Year of reference: 2016 
 
Table 3 – Has your organisation collaborated with other organisations  
in any of the following activities? (in percentages indicating ‘yes’) 
Activity Bel EU Ita Lit Neth Slo Swe Mean 
Funding research 22.7 37.9 / 19.9 31.5 18.9 22.4 27.3 
Fundraising 13.6 17.3 33.9 38.2 19.5 32.3 17.7 21.7 
Swapping supporter lists 18.7 11.1 52.7 9.2 22.5 11.3 / 20.2 
Sharing staff and 





































































                                                                                                                                                                                                
Table 4 – Predicting the level of cooperation among interest groups 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independent variables     






H2: Financial vulnerability 
 




Control variables     
Group type     
   Business (ref.) Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 


















































Country     
     
   Belgium (ref.) 
 
Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
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  Log-likelihood -4309.30 -2997.80 -2536.36 -1662.10 
  N 3254 2181 1999 1238 
Notes: The model is an ordered logistic regression with robust standard errors.  




                                                                                                                                                                                                
Figure 1 – Predicted probabilities for forming coalitions by varying levels 





Figure 2 – Predicted probabilities for forming coalitions by varying levels 
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Online Appendix 
 
Table A1 – Predicting the level of cooperation with OLS regressions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independent variables     






H2: Financial vulnerability 
 




Control variables     
Group type     
   Business (ref.) Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 


















































Country     
     
   Belgium (ref.) 
 
Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  




















































Diagnostics     








  R2 0.24 0.19 0.20 0.16 
  N 3254 2181 1999 1238 
Notes: The model is an OLS regression with robust standard errors.  






                                                                                                                                                                                                
Table A2 – Predicting the level of cooperation among interest groups (multilevel model) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independent variables     






H2: Financial vulnerability 
 




Control variables     
Group type     
   Business (ref.) Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 


















































Diagnostics     
























 Log-likelihood -4608.95 -3121.54 -2768.60 -1743.35 
 N 3254 2181 1999 1238 
Notes: The model is mixed effects regression analysis at the level of 7 countries (not 













                                                                                                                                                                                                
Table A3 – Predicting the level of cooperation among interest  
groups by including corporatism as an explanatory variable  
 Model 1 
Independent variables  








Control variables  
Corporatism scale 0.17*** 
(0.04) 
Group type  
   Business (ref.) Ref. 





















  Constant 0.36 
(0.20) 
  R2 0.14 
  N 1238 
Notes: The model is an OLS regression with robust 















                                                                                                                                                                                                
Table A4 – Predicting the level of cooperation by 
level of competition 
 Model 1 
Independent variables  




Influence vulnerability 0.11*** 
(0.03) 
Control variables  
Group type  
   Business (ref.) Ref. 






















   Belgium (ref.) 
 
Ref.  




















   EU  -0.14 
(0.08) 
Diagnostics  
  Constant 0.62*** 
(0.19) 
  R2 0.19 
  N 2171 
Notes: The model is an OLS regression with robust 









                                                                                                                                                                                                
Figure A1 – Predicted probabilities for forming coalitions by varying levels 
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Competition to aquire resources
Predictive Margins with 95% CIs
